External Mid-Term Evaluation of the Framework for Risk Governance and Adaptive Programming (FRAP)

Swiss Regional Programme Horn of Africa (RPHoA)

Duration: Between April – August 2024

Contract Type: Consultancy

Closing date: 22nd February 2024

Contextual and background
Somalia is among the most fragile and volatile context in the world. It has been at the bottom of rankings for state fragility, corruption perception, bribery risk and global peace indices over the past two decades. A mix of corruption and collusion is one of the leading causes of fragility. Systemic political corruption and patronage politics remain a significant problem for the delivery of development assistance. Foreign aid has regularly been converted into political rewards. The aid system was particularly shaken by large-scale diversion scandals during the 2011-2012 famine and as also revealed in the recently concluded investigation on post-delivery aid diversion (PDAD) in Somalia by the UN. These challenges continue to create significant accountability concerns. Systemic marginalization of minority clans and intersectional discrimination linked to gender and people with disabilities also contribute to increased fragility in Somalia. Accountability to the most left-behind groups is therefore important. The presence of non-state actors, some of them being designated as terrorist organizations by the international community or by some key stakeholders, increase the reputational risks of fund diversion that could be interpreted as illicit terrorist financing. The lack of comprehensive statistics extends to the dis aggregation of data for gender and different minorities and is exacerbating the serious marginalization they face.

Large parts of the rural areas have remained under the control of non-state actors (primarily armed groups). Field access remains extremely constrained and access is almost always paid for, further perpetuating corruption and diversion of funds. Constraints on access to South-Central Somalia increases the reliance of international implementing partners on local NGOs (LNGOs) and on the Red Crescent Movement. In 2012 and 2020, the UN/INGOs had withdrawn almost all their expatriate presence due to insecurity and COVID-19 concerns, with LNGOs left to respond. The existing power imbalance between LNGOs and their larger international counterparts (UN, INGOs), often leads to an unfair risk transfer onto national implementing partners. Zero tolerance for corruption policies by donors and international organizations often leads to a punitive, rather than corrective approach with regards to local actors. Counter-terrorism legislation further transfers risks to implementing partners, who try to manage access to areas controlled by non-state actors.

Because of the high fiduciary risks, international donors rarely enter direct partnerships with local actors – be it state authorities, LNGOs, local for-profit sector or think tanks. At the same time, the substitution of service delivery by international implementing partners and the primary reliance on international aid hamper the sustainable development of Somalia. Short-term collaboration between international and local actors creates challenges for the latter in terms of staff retention and longer-term capacity development including improved accountability systems. Increased and longer-term partnerships with local partners would represent an important element in fostering the endogenous response and service delivery capacity in Somalia. With a weak national state, non-state actors such as faith organizations, diaspora communities, traditional authorities, tribal structures, and private sector networks become more prominent and are promising though are neglected vectors for cooperation.

Given the security risks, most donor countries, including Switzerland, have had at best a limited physical presence in Somalia in the past 25 years. The security situation warrants that most donors will continue to rely on outsourcing for analysis, implementation and monitoring for the foreseeable future. Third-Party Monitoring (TPM) systems were launched over the last few years to deal with these risks, particularly for humanitarian aid delivery. This aims to resolve issues of access, but also to generate verified data on project performance.

Purpose of the evaluation
The mid-term evaluation should help FRAP achieve the results intended at the end of the intervention, by identifying lessons which can be drawn at this point in time, to inform further implementation of the current and planning of the next phase. The primary audience is SDC staff, selected implementing partners, donors and consultants, both in the region and globally. The report may also serve to inform interested stakeholders, such as potential donors. The dissemination policy will be decided at the end of the evaluation by SDC. The evaluation should therefore also identify (early signs of) unintended, positive and negative, results.

In line with the Swiss Regional Programme Horn of Africa (RPHoA) 2022-2025, Switzerland mandates the mid-term evaluation of Phase 01 of the FRAP programme to assess the progress of implementation towards meeting the set objectives and inform timely adaptations and its future phase.

Please click on the link https://www.eda.admin.ch/content/dam/countries/countries-content/kenia/en/tor-evaluation-frap_EN.pdf to refer to the Terms of Reference.